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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of institutional quality in attracting FDI in Algeria over 
the period 1995-2011 using the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index which reflects 
economic institutional quality (EIQ) and two governance indicators, namely: government 
effectiveness (GE) and voice and accountability (VA) that represent political institutional 
quality.  
 
The Johansen cointegration test has been employed in order to investigate the existence 
of long-run relationships among the tested variables. Additionally, the vector error correction 
model (VECM) has been applied to analyze the long-run and short-run dynamic relationships 
among the various time series, besides using both impulse response functions and variance 
decomposition. 
 
The main results indicate that there is a long run relationship among the tested variables 
and the VECM confirms the existence of this relationship. It is also revealed that both EIQ 
and VA have long-term positive effects on FDI inflows in Algeria. In the light of the results 
obtained from this study, it could be concluded that the improvement of economic freedom 
and voice and accountability in Algeria can be considered a fruitful plan for providing good 
investment climate and attracting more FDI inflows in the long term. 
                                                                                                                                           
Keywords: Institutional Quality, FDI, Algeria, Johansen Cointegration Test, VECM. 
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1. Introduction  
There is a broad consensus among researchers that inward FDI plays a vital role in the 
development process of the host countries in several ways, such as through knowledge 
spillover and capital accumulation (De Mello, 1999). Also, it is the main driver of 
technological diffusion, which is beneficial for developing economies (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, Lee, 1998). 
 
FDI induces the promotion of host countries’ transport and communication 
infrastructures. Moreover, multinational corporations (MNCs) that conduct FDI are 
considered an engine of competition, innovation, know-how and managerial skills, thus they 
are able to improve the productivity and performance of local firms in host economies 
(Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Romer, 1993). 
 
Considering the importance of macroeconomic factors in attracting FDI inflows, recent 
studies have highlighted the essential role played by institutional factors in creating a more 
attractive investment climate (Nasir and Hassan, 2011). These factors are characterized by 
property rights protection, rule of law, the effective use of resources, the absence of violence, 
barriers and restrictive policies. These factors are what foreign investors are looking for when 
entering a host country. Moreover, all these elements have been taken into consideration in 
most investment decisions, and for this reason many developing countries have focused on 
promoting their institutional quality in order to benefit from FDI’s advantages. Algeria is one 
of these countries that has a great desire to attract more FDI, which remains modest and is 
associated with weak political and economic institutional quality. Thus, this directed study 
aims to test the impact of institutional quality in attracting FDI inflows in Algeria over the 
period 1995-2011. For this purpose, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of institutional quality in 
attracting FDI inflows, section 3 discusses foreign direct investment inflows, political and 
economic institutional quality in Algeria, section 4 introduces the data and econometric 
model, section 5 analyses the empirical results and finally section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Institutional 
Quality in Attracting FDI Inflows 
2.1. The Impact of Political Institutional Quality in Attracting FDI Inflows 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010) define governance as “The 
traditions and institutions by which the authority in a country is exercised”, also they 
introduced six worldwide governance indicators scaled between -2.5 and +2.5, where a higher 
score means better quality of institutions, and the simple average of these indicators can be 
considered as the best available proxy for political institutional quality (Williams and 
Siddique, 2008; Singh, Jain-Chandra, and Mohommad, 2012; Alonso and Garcimartín, 
2013). 
 The six elements comprising the governance indicator positively influence the 
countries’ ability to receive more FDI inflows as follows:  
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*Voice and Accountability: are responsible for providing a free investment climate from 
future violations of the foreign investors’ rights (Inter American Development Bank, 2001; 
Siddharthan, 2009). 
 
*Political Stability and Absence of Violence: these two factors ensure the continuity of 
MNCs’ activities and FDI projects in the host countries (Inter American Development Bank, 
2001), FDI is a long-term investment, and any kind of threat will impede the future return 
flow and this is not desired by foreign investors (Fazio and Talamo, 2008). Moreover, most 
multinational companies avoid FDI in cases of high political risk and move towards other 
forms of international business (Meier, 2006). 
*Government Effectiveness: facilitates foreign investors’ activity through the reduction of 
heavy bureaucracy, procedures and the overall time it takes for any agent to complete them 
(Inter American Development Bank, 2001; OECD, 2002).  
 
*Regulatory Quality: encourages the entry of foreign investors by eleminating market 
unfriendly policies such as price controls, government intervention, and restrictions on capital 
movement (Fazio and Talamo, 2008). 
 
*Rule of Law: stimulates current decision making that maximizes the long-term value of 
assets, because future returns will be protected in the presence of the rule of law (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 2005). 
*Control of Corruption: corruption can be considered a form of taxation; it does not only 
reduce FDI inflows, but also contributes to changing the types of inward FDI (Dunning, 
1993). Moreover, some bureaucratic regulations come as a result of widespread corruption 
and are not intended to correct market distortions or even protect investors (Alam, Mian and 
Smith, 2006). Also pervasive corruption leads to inefficient long term plans due to 
uncertainty, and causes an ambiguity about return predictability (Sabri, 2008). On the other 
hand, corruption can attract more foreign investors by reducing heavy bureaucracy and 
providing fast and efficient government services (Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Swaleheen and 
Stansel, 2007). 
2.2. The Impact of Economic Institutional Quality in Attracting FDI 
Inflows 
 
Many researchers argue that economic freedom reflects economic institutional quality 
(Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Heriot, Theis andCampbell, 2008; Caetano and Caleiro, 
2009; Pourshahabi, Mahmoudinia, and Soderjani, 2011; Nasir and Hassan, 2011; Subasat 
and Bellos, 2011).  
In 1995, Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal introduced the Index of Economic 
Freedom (which contains ten economic freedoms scaled from 0 to 100, where 100 represents 
maximum freedom) with a comprehensive definition of Economic Freedom as follows: “All 
liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services. The 
highest forms of economic freedom should provide an absolute right of property ownership; 
full freedom of movement for labor, capital, and goods; and an absolute absence of coercion 
or constraint of economic liberty beyond that which is necessary for the protection and 
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maintenance of liberty itself ” (Heritage Foundation, 2013). Moreover, economic freedom is 
the main factor of the attractiveness of FDI, and a good illustration of economic freedom’s 
importance requires scutinizing the impact of its 10 subcomponents as follows: 
• Business Freedom eases the success of foreign investors by eleminating the excessive 
regulations and rigid bankruptcy procedures, and it’s important to note that almost all 
multinational firms decide to invest in countries where it is easy to enter and exit from the 
market (Heritage Foundation, 2013). 
 
• Trade Freedom has two opposite effects on inward FDI depending on the type of this 
investment. In other words, Horizontal FDI (which is directed to the final consumption 
market) is expected to decline with the rise of trade freedom that allows the entry of goods 
similar to those produced by foreign investors in this host country. In contrast, Vertical FDI 
(which specializes in manufacturing the intermediate goods and semi-final products) is 
supposed to rise with high trade freedom for its permanent need to import and export, also 
trade openness attracts both export-oriented and efficiency-seeking FDI (Salism, 2004). 
However, protectionist policies of host countries, such as trade restrictions, keep advanced-
technology goods and services away from host countries (Heritage Foundation, 2013).  
 
• Fiscal Freedom means more profits for foreign investors because a higher fiscal burden 
leads to lower revenues (Serin and Caliskan, 2012; Meier, 2006). Furthermore, fiscal policies 
reflect the government’s budget,. For example, large deficits could lead to high taxes. 
 
• Government Spending (Freedom from Government) affects inward FDI in two different 
ways. On one hand, excessive government spending generates crowding out effects that lead 
to a misallocation of resources and reduce the MNC’s productivity.  On the other hand, it 
contributes to the improvement of infrastructure and human capital, thus it constructs the 
necessary basis for FDI entry (Heritage Foundation, 2013). 
 
• Monetary Freedom that curbs inflation and price instability makes foreign investors able 
to rely on market prices in the future besides doing other long-term planning such as savings 
and investments (Heritage Foundation, 2013). 
 
• Investment Freedom induces the expansion of foreign investors’activitiy and drives it 
towards the appropriate directions characterized by high returns and low risks. Also, it 
encourages innovation and competition, and supports all types of foreign companies, 
including, of course, small firms (Heritage Foundation, 2013). 
 
• Financial Freedom allows foreign investors to benefit from fair funding opportunities, 
the most efficient financial intermediation and real-time information on prices (Heritage 
Foundation, 2013). Additionally, these investors search for any financial incentive to 
minimize the cost of doing business (Cohen, 2007). 
 
• Property Rights should be well protected by the host country’s constitution, including 
securing full compensation in cases of expropriation, because these two elements make 
foreign investors feel safe (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2003). 
In addition, weak protection of property rights leads inward FDI towards distribution rather 
than production (Dunning, 1993). 
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• Freedom from Corruption helps foreign investors to avoid the undesirable costs 
resulting from widespread corruption, because they could be unaware of some unwritten rules 
(Serin and Caliskan, 2012).  
 
• Labour Freedom eliminates restrictive labour policies that obstruct MNCs’ activities, 
such as wage controls, hiring and firing restrictions. Moreover, freedom in the labor market is 
required just like freedom in the goods and services market (Heritage Foundation, 2013). 
 
The quantitative impact of institutional quality on inward FDI has occupied the attention 
of researchers in last decades, and the table below summarizes the empirical studies that have 
investigated the effect of institutional quality on FDI inflows. 
 
Table 1: Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Institutional Quality in Attracting FDI Inflows  
Authors Sample Empirical approach 
 
Results 
Amal, M., Tomio, 
B.T., and R. Raboch, 
H. (2010) 
Latin American 
countries 
1996- 2008 
Panel Data Analysis 
 
Government 
effectiveness has a 
negative and 
significant impact on 
FDI inflows. In 
contrast, political 
stability has a positive 
and significant effect 
on inward FDI, while 
the other governance 
indicators appear with  
insignificant values. 
Koen Berden, Jeffrey 
H. Bergstrand and 
Eva van Etten (2012) 
28 OECD countries as 
source countries, 124 
target countries 
1997-2004 
 
State-of-the-Art 
Gravity Specifications 
Motivated by the 
General Equilibrium 
Knowledge-and-
Physical-Capital 
model, Traditional 
Gravity Equation, OLS 
Method 
The inward FDI is 
significantly negatively 
affected by 
government 
effectiveness; also a 
higher level of ‘voice 
and accountability’ 
reduces the inward 
FDI. 
Turan Subasat and  
Sotirios Bellos (2013) 
18 Latin American 
countries  
1985-2004 
Panel Data Gravity 
Model 
There is a negative and 
statistically significant 
relationship between 
all governance 
indicators and FDI 
inflows in selected 
Latin American 
countries. 
Steven Globerman and 
Daniel Shapiro (2002) 
144 countries   
1995–1997 
 
OLS Method, 
Heteroskedastic-
Consistent Standard 
Errors 
 
Both ‘Voice and 
accountability’ and 
‘Government 
effectiveness’ 
contribute positively in 
rising FDI inflows. 
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Marta Bengoa, Blanca 
Sanchez-Robles 
(2003)  
18 Latin-American 
countries  
1970-1999 
 
Cross Country and 
Panel Data Analysis 
 
The host country’s 
economic freedom is 
found to be a positive 
and statistically 
significant determinant 
of FDI inflows. 
Steven Globerman, 
Daniel Shapiro and 
Yao Tang (2006) 
138 countries 
1995-2001 
GLS 
Random Effects 
Estimation 
Good governance 
increases FDI inflows. 
Méon, P.G. and K. 
Sekkat (2007) 
96 countries  
1990-2000 
Two-Stage Least 
Squares Regressions 
 
‘Voice and 
accountability’ has a 
positive and 
statistically significant 
impact 
on the FDI to GDP 
ratio. 
Kirk C.Heriot, John 
Theis and Noel 
D.Campbell (2008)  
 
121 countries 
1970- 2005 
Pooled OLS Higher levels of 
economic freedom 
attract more FDI 
inflows. 
Murat M. Kenisarin 
and Philip Andrews-
Speed (2008) 
153 countries 
1998-2004 
 
Regression 
Correlations 
Both governance 
indicator and economic 
freedom index 
positively influence the 
inward FDI.  
José Martins Caetano 
and António Bento 
Caleiro (2009) 
MENA countries+ EU 
countries 
1999/2001- 2005/07 
 
Fuzzy Logic Clustering The inward FDI is 
positively associated 
with greater levels of 
economic freedom. 
W.N.W. Azman-Saini, 
Ahmad Zubaidi 
Baharumshah and 
Siong Hook Law 
(2010) 
85 countries 
1976–2004 
The Generalized 
Method-of-Moments 
(GMMs) Panel 
Estimator 
 
Countries that promote 
economic freedom 
absorb more FDI‘s 
benefits. 
 
Saeed Rasekhi and 
Zeinab Seyedi (2010) 
10 developing 
countries 1995-2004 
Panel Data Analysis, 
Fixed Effect Method 
Economic 
liberalization positively 
affects the inward FDI. 
Turan Subasat and 
Sotiris Bellos (2011) 
 
24 target countries 
from Latin America 
1985-2008 
Panel Gravity Model Economic freedom is 
considered as an 
essential determinant 
of FDI in the selected 
countries, but its effect 
cannot be generalised. 
 
Nassima Debab, Ali Al 
Mansoor (2011) 
Bahrain  
1990-2009 
OLS Estimation 
 
The efficient 
environment 
characterized by higher 
levels of economic 
Freedom is likely to 
attract foreign 
investors. 
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Zafar Mueen Nasir 
and Arshad Hassan 
(2011) 
South Asian countries 
1995-2008 
Panel Data Analysis, 
Fixed Effects Model 
 
There is a significant 
positive relationship 
between economic 
freedom score and FDI 
inflows. 
Farshid Pourshahabi, 
Davoud Mahmoudinia 
and Ehsan Salimi 
Soderjani (2011) 
OECD countries  
1997-2007 
Panel Data Method, 
Random Effect 
Estimation 
 
Economic Freedom in 
OECD countries has an 
insignificant positive 
impact on inward FDI. 
Kahai, Simran K. 
(2011) 
55 developing 
countries 
1998- 2000 
Pooled OLS The inward FDI is 
significantly positively 
related to the level of 
economic freedom. 
Aviral Kumar Tiwari 
(2011) 
28 Asian countries 
1998-2007 
Dynamic Panel Data 
Techniques 
Positive correlation 
between FDI inflows 
and 4freedoms, namely 
(Business freedom, 
Fiscal freedom, 
Investment freedom, 
Trade freedom). 
Dennis Pearson, Dong 
Nyonna and Kil-Joong 
Kim (2012) 
50 US states 
1984-2007 
Random Effects 
Regression Model 
FDI inflows move 
towards states that 
enjoy higher levels of 
economic freedom.  
 
Ourvashi Bissoon 
(2012) 
45 developing 
countries in the 
African, Latin 
American and Asian 
regions  
1996-2005 
OLS Estimation 
 
The level of FDI 
inflows is significantly 
positively influenced 
by all governance 
indicators. 
Yassaman 
Saadatmand, Jeremy 
Choquette (2012) 
51 African countries 
1998-2009 
 
Panel Data Regression Economic freedom 
discourages FDI 
inflows to the selected 
African countries. 
 
Sedik, W. M. (2012) MENA countries 
1999-2010 
 
Multiple Linear 
Regressions, Panel data 
Analysis, OLS Method 
 
Government 
effectiveness has a 
positive and significant 
impact on FDI inflows. 
‘Voice & 
accountability’ is 
significantly negatively 
related to the inward 
FDI. 
Source : Constructed By Authors 
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3. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, Political and Economic Institutional 
Quality in Algeria  
3.1. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in Algeria 
Figure 1: FDI Net Inflows (% of GDP) in Algeria, 1995-2011. 
 
Source : World Bank, World Development Indicators, the data are available online at : 
http://data.worldbank.org (accessed 01/09/2013). 
As is clearly visible in the graph above, Algeria has seen a slight increase in inward 
FDI. In the 80’s, the entry of FDI was only allowed in the hydrocarbon sector. In the 90’s, the 
Algerian economy received a small size of FDI inflows due to their weak political situation 
characterized by violence and instability. Thus this situation has prevented the arrival of 
foreign investors in all economic sectors (OECD, 2006). High oil prices have contributed to 
reducing foreign debts and improving the Algerian financial situation (Darbouche, 2011).  In 
2001, Algeria witnessed considerable FDI inflows, especially with the issuance of a new 
investment act which included a package of incentives, privileges and guarantees for foreign 
investors. Also, the economic recovery support programme launched in April 2001 has helped 
to attract more FDI inflows through the promotion of infrastructure (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007). Moreover, Algeria has made several steps to ease doing business, such as the 
commercial law amendment, the reduction of tax burden and business registration procedures. 
Then, the inward FDI has decreased due to persistent problems such as high youth 
unemployment, rigid labor regulations, regulatory complexity, and high transaction costs 
resulting from complicated administrative procedures (African Development Bank Group, 
2011). It rose again because of the stable business environment associated with its good 
financial situation, thanks to large oil revenues. Furthermore, the Algerian economy was less 
influenced by the 2008 global financial crisis compared to other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
FDI
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 16, No. 2, September 2014 
150 
 
3.2. The Political Institutional Quality in Algeria 
Figure 2: The Political Institutional Quality (The Simple Average of Six Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) in Algeria. 
 
Source : World Bank Governance Indicators, the data are available online at : 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed  01/09/2013). 
This graph clearly shows that the political institutional quality in Algeria still occupied 
the negative field despite some reform efforts. The following reasons stand behind the long-
standing institutional weaknesses: the past dark decade was characterized by extreme violence 
and social unrest, pervasive corruption, and a lack of economic diversification due to the great 
dependence on hydrocarbons sector. However, the Algerian government has made a few steps 
in order to revitalize the institutional environment, such as the repeal of the emergency law, 
some improvements in press freedom, and the expansion of participation in parliamentary 
elections (Freedom House, 2013). It is important to point out that the abundance of natural 
resources is often associated with weak institutional quality, but it encourages FDI inflows, 
because large MNCs also engaged in rent-seeking behavior (Subasat and Bellos, 2013).  
 
3.3. The Economic Institutional Quality in Algeria 
Figure 3: Economic Freedom Score in Algeria, 1996-2011. 
 
Source : Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, the data are available online at : 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year (accessed 01/09/2013). 
Algeria’s economic freedom has witnessed considerable fluctuations, and it receives a 
low ranking compared to most MENA countries for several reasons, such as expansionary 
government spending, inefficient business regulations, foreign ownership restrictions, 
restrictive trade barriers, an underdeveloped financial sector, an independent judicial system, 
and widespread corruption. It is important to note that the dominant hydrocarbons sector does 
not generate the incentives needed to open up the Algerian economy (Heritage Foundation, 
2013). 
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4. Data and Econometric Model 
This study aims to test the effect of institutional quality on FDI inflows in Algeria over 
the period (1995-2011) using the following variables: 
FDI: represents foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP) from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).  
PIQ: Political Institutional Quality, which is calculated as a simple average of the following 
six Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
VA: Voice and Accountability 
PSAV: Political Stability and the Absence of Violence 
GE: Government Effectiveness                                                                                                       
RQ: Regulatory Quality                                                                                                                         
RL: Rule of Law                                                                                                                                 
CC: Control of Corruption 
EIQ: Economic Institutional Quality proxied by Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom. 
 
In order to investigate whether all the variables included in the model are cointegrated, 
the Johansen cointegration test (which is based on two likelihood test statistics, namely the 
trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics) has been used. Then we employ a Vector Error-
Correction Model (VECM) to examine the long-run and short- run dynamic relationships 
among the various time series. Moreover, both impluse response functions and variance 
decomposition have been applied for scrutinizing the restricted VAR model results, by using 
the Eviews 6.0 software package. 
5. Analysis of Empirical Results  
5.1. Phillips Perron Unit Root Test 
 Level First Difference 
 
Intercept 
 
Trend & 
Intercept 
None 
 
Intercept 
 
Trend & 
Intercept 
None 
 
FDI -2.536614 
 (-3.065585) 
-4.818089* 
(-3.733200) 
-0.417815 
(-1.964418) 
-7.005691* 
 (-3.081002) 
-7.690984* 
(-3.759743) 
-6.293251* 
(-1.966270) 
PIQ -1.279678 
(-3.065585) 
-0.824648 
(-3.733200) 
-0.734504 
 (-1.964418) 
-2.988866 
(-3.081002) 
-3.063073 
(-3.759743) 
-3.067656* 
(-1.966270) 
VA -1.413172 
(-3.065585) 
-1.681956 
 (-3.733200) 
-1.146239 
(-1.964418) 
-4.066878* 
(-3.081002) 
-5.542777* 
(-3.759743) 
-3.899552* 
(-1.966270) 
PSAV -1.336998 
(-3.065585) 
-1.933000 
 (-3.733200) 
-1.400882 
 (-1.964418) 
-3.212299* 
 (-3.081002) 
-3.703104 
 (-3.759743) 
-3.193157* 
(-1.966270) 
RL -1.582212 
 (-3.065585) 
-1.201790 
 (-3.733200) 
-1.019573 
(-1.964418) 
-3.783206* 
 (-3.081002) 
-3.556024 
 (-3.759743) 
-3.826314* 
(-1.966270) 
RQ    -0.401181 
(-3.065585) 
-0.375560 
(-3.733200) 
 0.585136 
 (-1.964418) 
-2.420845 
 (-3.081002) 
-3.224423 
 (-3.759743) 
-2.402046* 
(-1.966270) 
GE -1.809660 
(-3.065585) 
-1.823483 
 (-3.733200) 
-1.539604 
 (-1.964418) 
-4.172141* 
 (-3.081002) 
-5.951983* 
(-3.759743) 
-3.784924* 
(-1.966270) 
CC -1.673457 
 (-3.065585) 
-2.489671 
 (-3.733200) 
-0.329867 
(-1.964418) 
-3.522329* 
 (-3.081002) 
-3.653570 
 (-3.759743) 
-3.651100* 
 (-1.966270) 
EIQ -2.336867 
 (-3.065585) 
-2.162898 
(-3.733200) 
-0.481207 
 (-1.964418) 
-4.969918* 
(-3.081002) 
-5.088760* 
(-3.759743) 
-5.088760* 
(-1.966270) 
*indicates statistically significant at 5% level of significance. 
  (Test critical values at 5% level of significance). 
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From the table above, the Phillips Perron test indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected for the following variables: FDI, PIQ, EIQ, because the PP value is 
greater than the critical t-value at 5% level of significance, hence, we can conclude that these 
variables are not stationary at their levels. Then again, after first differencing FDI, EIQ, the 
null hypothesis of a unit root in the PP test was rejected at the 5% significance level, so these 
variables are stationary at their first differences.  
 
The Phillips Perron unit root test has been applied on the six elements comprising 
political institutional quality, because PIQ was found to be integrated of the order two, thus it 
is considered as an inappropriate variable for the Johansen cointegration test. According to the 
Phillips Perron test, GE and VA are stationary at their first differences, in contrast the other 
political variables are not integrated of the order one I(1).Thus, we can proceed to the long 
run cointegration analysis between FDI, EIQ, GE and VA  by employing the Johansen 
cointegration test.  
 
5.2. Trace and Max Eigenvalue Tests  
The null hypothesis indicates 1 cointegrating equation has been accepted because both 
Trace and Max Eigenvalues are less than the critical values at the 5% significance level. 
Hence, it can be concluded that there is a long-run relationship between the following 
variables: FDI, EIQ, GE and VA (see appendix 1). 
5.3. Cointegrating Equation  
 
FDI= 0.089223*EIQ - 18.49491*GE + 15.05337*VA  (see appendix 2) 
 
According to the cointegrating equation, EIQ and VA have the expected positive impact 
on FDI inflows to Algeria. In contrast, there is an unexpected negative relationship between 
inward FDI and government effectiveness. 
 
5.4. Vector Error Correction Model 
Most of the VAR lag order selection criteria suggested that 1 lag is the relevant lag 
length for the vector error correction model (see appendix 3).  
 
The table in appendix 4 does not show the probability value of all coefficients. For this 
reason we have estimated the VECM equation (where FDI is a dependent variable) using an 
OLS regression, because this method provides an obvious view about the significance of 
variables. 
 
5.4.1. The Long Run Causality  
The error correction term C (1) carries the expected negative sign, moreover it is 
significant at 5% level of significance, and this confirms the existence of a long run 
relationship between FDI, EIQ, GE and VA. In other words, there is a long-term impact of the 
explanatory variables included in the model on FDI inflows in Algeria (see appendix 5). 
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5.4.2. The Short Run Causality  
 
Government effectiveness has a significant positive impact on attracting FDI inflows in 
Algeria in the short term at the 10% significance level. In contrast, EIQ and VA have a 
negative short run effect on FDI, but EIQ’s effect is insignificant at 5 % level of significance 
(see appendix 5). 
 
 The short run causality of economic institutional quality 
 
The probability value (0.4667) that accompanies the Wald Chi-square is greater than 
0.05. Hence, the null hypothesis which indicates that EIQ doesn't cause FDI inflows in the 
short term has been accepted (see appendix 6).  
 
 The short run causality of government effectiveness   
 
The probalibity value (0.0243) that accompanies the Chi-square test statistic is less than 
0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected and GE has short run causality on inward FDI 
in Algeria (see appendix 7). 
 
 The short run causality of voice and accountability  
 
The probability value (0.0187) that accompanies the Chi-square test statistic is smaller 
than 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected and VA causes FDI inflows in the short 
term (see appendix 8). 
 
 
5.5. Diagnostic Tests of Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
5.5.1. Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test indicated that there is homoskedasticity because the Prob 
(CHi
2
) = 0.8473 that accompanies the amount (Obs*R
2
) is greater than 0.05 (see appendix 9). 
5.5.2. Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH 
ARCH test confirmed the absence of an ARCH effect as a result of accepting the null 
hypothesis (Prob (CHi
2
) = 0.4190> 0.05) (see appendix 10). 
5.5.3. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
Prob (CHi
2
) = 0.1996 is greater than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation cannot be rejected (see appendix 11). 
5.5.4. Jarque Bera Normality Test  
According to Jarque Bera normality test, the residuals are normally distributed 
because Prob (Jarque Bera) = 0.7998 is greater than 0.05 which leads us to accept the null 
hypothesis (see appendix 12). 
All these diagnostic tests indicate that the Vector Error Correction Model is well 
specified. 
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5.6. Impluse Response Function of FDI, EIQ, GE, VA Relation (see appendix 
13) 
5.6.1. The Response of FDI to One Standard Deviation FDI Shock 
A positive FDI shock causes a fall of 0.29 units in FDI inflows in the second year, then 
it rises slowly to reach its highest value of 0.50 units in the fourth year, after that it sees 
smooth fluctuations in the positive area. 
5.6.2. The Response of FDI to One Standard Deviation EIQ Shock 
By giving one positive EIQ shock, the inward FDI enters to the negative field with a 
value of -0.0097 units in the next second year, and witnesses a slight rise to 0.14 units in the 
third year but it falls again to -0.03 units in the fifth year,then it continues fluctuating around 
the zero line. 
 
5.6.3. The Response of FDI to One Standard Deviation GE Shock 
By giving one standard deviation GE shock, the inward FDI becomes negative for one-
time during the ten years with a value of -0.01 units in the next second year, then it rises to its 
highest positive value (0.05 units) in the next fifth year, then it keeps fluctuating in the 
positive field. 
5.6.4. The Response of FDI to One Standard Deviation VA Shock 
A positive VA shock leads to rise FDI inflows by 0.26 units in the next third year, then 
it sees remarkable fluctuations in the positive area. 
 
 
5.7. Variance Decomposition of FDI, EIQ, GE, VA Relation (see appendix 14) 
 
The forecast error variance in FDI reaches 0.47 units in the first period, and then it sees 
a slight increase to 1.36 units in the tenth period due to the combination of the following 
independent variables: EIQ, GE, and VA. 
In the short term (the second year), 98.48 % of the forecast error variance of FDI is 
explained by its own innovations, while only 0.029% of the innovations in FDI is due to EIQ, 
followed by GE (0.116%) and VA (1.366%) . 
 
In the medium term (the fifth period), the variance decomposition of FDI shows that the 
innovations in FDI are largely explained by its own shocks (86.74%), 2.31% of  EIQ’s 
shocks, 0.53% of GE’s shocks and 10.39% of VA’s shocks. 
 
In the long term (the tenth period) FDI‘s innovations explain almost 87.94 % of its 
forecast error variance while EIQ, GE and VA explain about 1.60%, 0.43% and 10.01% of the 
total variation, respectively. 
These results reflect the major role played by FDI in explaining its forecast error 
variance. Although the ratios converge, VA’s contribution is slightly more important than 
both EIQ and GE’s contributions in interpreting the forecast error variance of FDI, especially 
in the long term. 
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6. Conclusion  
In this paper we have analysed the impact of institutional quality in attracting FDI in 
Algeria over the period 1995-2011 using the following tests: Phillips Perron unit root test, 
Johansen cointegration test, vector error correction model, some diagnostic tests, impluse 
response functions and variance decomposition. The initial findings reveal that there is a long 
run relationship among the following variables: FDI inflows, economic institutional quality, 
(government effectiveness and voice and accountability that reflect the political institutional 
quality), according to the cointegrating equation, EIQ and VA have the expected positive 
impact on FDI inflows in Algeria. In contrast, government effectiveness negatively affects the 
inward FDI.  
Furthermore, the vector error correction model (VECM) confirmed the existence of a 
long-run relationship between FDI inflows, EIQ, GE and VA. Moreover it suggested that 
government effectiveness has a positive and significant short run impact on FDI inflows at the 
10% level of significance. On the other hand both EIQ and VA appear to have unexpected 
negative effects. 
In the light of the results obtained from this study, it can be concluded that economic 
institutional quality and voice and accountability are essential factors in attracting FDI 
inflows to Algeria in the long term. Additionally, it is important to point out that the control 
of government actions in Algeria can reduce the violation of foreign investors’ rights, and the 
improvement of Algerian economic freedom plays a vital role in reducing legislation that 
could hamper business productivity and profitability, increasing the freedom of dealing with 
the outside world, decreasing the tax burden and crowding out effects, and encouraging 
innovation and competition. Thus it is a priority to provide a good investment climate for FDI 
inflows.  
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Appendix 4 : Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) using Least Squares Method 
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Appendix 7: The Short run Causality of Government Effectiveness   
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Appendix 10: ARCH Test 
 
Appendix 11: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
Appendix 12: Jarque Bera Normality Test 
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Appendix 13: Impluse Response Function of FDI, EIQ, GE, VA Relation 
 
 
Appendix 14: Variance Decomposition of FDI, EIQ, GE, VA Relation 
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